Labor markets and labor market institutions in transition economies by Lehmann, Hartmut & Muravyev, Alexander
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Labor markets and labor market 
institutions in transition economies 
 
 
 
Hartmut Lehmann 
Alexander Muravyev 
 
 
 
 
 
Quaderni  - Working Paper DSE N° 783  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
Labor markets and labor market institutions in transition economies* 
 
Hartmut Lehmann (University of Bologna and IZA) 
Alexander Muravyev (IZA and St. Petersburg University GSOM) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper summarizes the evolution of labor markets and labor market institutions and 
policies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as of Central Asia over the last 
two decades. The main focus is on the evolution of labor market institutions, which are 
among candidate explanations for the very diverse trajectories of labor markets in the region. 
We consider recent contributions that attempt to assess the effect of labor market institutions 
on labor market performance of TEs, including the policy-relevant issue of complementarity 
of institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is on the evolution of labor markets and labor market institutions and policies in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as of Central Asia over the last two 
decades. As the dynamics of labor market outcomes in these transition economies (TEs) has 
drawn considerable attention already in the early years of transition and resulted in a 
voluminous literature easily available elsewhere, the paper provides only a sketchy summary 
of the topic. Instead, we focus on the much less explored issue of the evolution of labor 
market institutions, which are among candidate explanations for the very diverse trajectories 
of labor markets in the region. We consider recent contributions that attempt to assess the 
effect of labor market institutions on labor market performance of TEs, including the policy-
relevant issue of complementarity of institutions.  
 
2. Labor Market Dynamics 
The transition from plan to market, which countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as 
of Central Asia (transition economies, TEs) embarked in the late 1980s-early 1990s, implied 
profound changes in their labor markets. Until the late 1980s, most of these economies, apart 
from Yugoslavia, were characterized by large excess labor demand, no open unemployment, 
and high labor force participation. For example, estimates of the actual unemployment in the 
USSR show numbers of the order of 1 to 2 percent and the available statistics on employment 
show employment ratios among those aged 15-59 being as high as 83.6 percent in the late 
1980s. These very high employment rates and close to zero open unemployment came, 
however, at a price as extremely low labor productivity and substantial labor hoarding were 
pervasive features of the centrally planned economy (Granick, 1987).  
The start of the transition saw a rapidly collapsing demand for labor. In part, it was a 
consequence of the inefficient use of labor resources during the central planning period, 
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which became apparent once market forces were released in TEs. More importantly, it 
reflected the collapse of output that TEs were facing in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Indeed, from the start of transition in 1989 until the resumption of economic growth, these 
countries lost from between one-fifth and more than two-thirds of their pre-transition level of 
GDP (EBRD, 2000). Figure 1 illustrates this pattern. For presentational purposes, we 
distinguish between Central European economies (CEE)1, South Eastern European economies 
(SEE)2, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)3, and compare them with the 
EU-15 and the US. Figure 1 shows a relatively modest and short decline in GDP in CEE 
occurring in the early 1990s and a much deeper and longer recession in CIS. SEE countries 
stand out as the region impacted by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Overall, at the end 
of the 1990s, robust economic growth came back to all the regions and remained until the 
2008 financial crisis. During this period, TEs were growing faster than both the EU-15 and 
the US.    
How did the labor markets of TEs respond to these dramatic changes in GDP? In 
general, the adjustment of the labor markets following the initial transition shock occurred via 
falling employment rates, rising unemployment, reductions in working hours, and decreasing 
real wages – the whole gamut of the available adjustment mechanisms. However, these 
different mechanisms played out with different intensity in the various transition regions 
(Svejnar, 1999). In particular, during the early transition, CEE experienced falling 
employment rates and growing unemployment, accompanied by a modest decline in real 
wages. The former Soviet Union instead saw collapsing real wages with relatively limited 
                                                 
1 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia. 
2 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, 
and Serbia. 
3 Until recently, the CIS included 12 out of 15 constituent republics of the former USSR, 
namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, with Georgia officially 
leaving the organization in August 2009. 
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rises in at least, official rates, of unemployment and falls in employment (Boeri and Terrell, 
2002).4 Figures 2 and 3 provide some support for this point. Despite a much more dramatic 
decline in GDP, employment in CIS fell less than in CEE while the unemployment rate 
remained lower than in CEE until the late 1990s. SEE experienced a large decline in 
employment and high unemployment, but this was largely due to the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia since the unemployment and employment dynamics in Bulgaria and Romania, 
not affected by the conflict, are quite similar to that in CEE.  
Interestingly, the resumption of economic growth in CEE in the mid-1990s was not 
accompanied by increasing employment and falling unemployment. For example, Poland and 
Slovakia, while growing fast, experienced large declines in employment and increases in 
unemployment, which approached 20% in the early 2000s. Only since then has there been a 
steady increase in the employment rate and a decline in the unemployment rate in CEE. CIS 
countries, which grew very fast between the late 1990s and 2008, did not, on average, see any 
increases in employment. It mostly remained flat (Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine) or even 
declined (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova) despite the robust economic growth in the region. The 
unemployment rate in CIS nevertheless saw some decline after its peak in the late 1990s. As 
for SEE, some upturn in employment occurred in the mid-2000s, albeit it remains rather low 
and unemployment very high in the region (except for Bulgaria and Romania).  
 Presented at the level of the three large country groups, the data suggest considerable 
heterogeneity in the evolution of labor markets in transition countries over the last two 
decades. The differences are even larger if one avoids aggregation and examines separate 
countries. The countries of CIS then appear by far the most diverse in terms of economic 
development and labor market dynamics, with increasing heterogeneity in the most recent 
                                                 
4 Non-standard mechanisms of labour market adjustment became widespread in CIS in the 
1990s. These included wage arrears, forced leaves, reduction in working hours and in-kind 
payments in lieu of cash wages (Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1999; Earle and 
Sabirianova, 2002). 
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years. On one side of the spectrum, there are resource-rich countries like Russia and 
Kazakhstan with modest, single-digit unemployment rates and a high employment rate 
(above 70%). On the other side there are low-income countries like Armenia and Tajikistan, 
with higher unemployment and a very low employment rate (below 50% as of 2009).  Indeed, 
the recent data provide some support to the view expressed in Rutkowski and Scarpetta 
(2005) that a divide is emerging between labor markets of high- and upper middle-income 
European transition countries, particularly in CEE, and of low-income countries, especially 
those of Central Asia:  
‘Labor markets in European transition economies in many respects resemble 
those in developed economies of Europe, in both positive (for example, 
productivity growth) and negative aspects (for example, high and stagnant 
unemployment). In contrast, labor markets in low-income CIS countries seem to 
become similar to those in other low-income countries, with typical 
characteristics such as the dominant informal sector, underemployment, and low 
productivity employment.’ 
 
3. Labor Market Institutions and Policies 
The diverse and often unconventional patterns of labor market adjustment in TEs have caused 
scholars and policy-makers to look for institutional explanations of these different labor 
market outcomes.  
The set of labor market institutions that TEs had at the beginning of transition was 
rather atypical of mature market economies, but has changed considerably over the last 20 
years. In the late 1980s, workers still felt well protected from unemployment in most parts of 
the region, but the protection stemmed from excess demand for labor, rather than from 
institutions such as employment protection legislation, an active role of trade unions 
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regarding workers’ rights, or unemployment benefits.5 In fact, many of such labor market 
institutions and policies were simply missing. It was not until the late 1980s when, against the 
background of looming unemployment, TEs engaged in an active development of specific 
institutions and policies in order to ensure an effective functioning of labor markets. Two 
decades after the start of the transition process, most countries have established sets of labor 
market institutions and policies, similar to those existing in mature market economies. 
Below we focus on the evolution of key labor market institutions and policies in 
transition countries over the last two decades and compare them with the respective 
institutions and policies in the EU-15 and the US. Similarly to studies of OECD economies, 
the focus is on employment protection legislation (EPL), union density, coverage and 
bargaining, the tax wedge on labor, the duration of unemployment benefits, the average 
replacement ratio and expenditures on active labor market policies (ALMP).  
 
3.1. Employment protection legislation 
There is some debate in the literature concerning the evolution of employment protection in 
TEs over the two last decades. To a large extent, the debate stems from the lack of a 
commonly agreed measure of employment protection, which reflects the general difficulty of 
measuring institutions.6 Some sources suggest that during the early transition period, 
employment protection in many countries, especially those of CIS and SEE, was quite tough, 
reflecting socialist legacies. These rigid regulations were subsequently liberalized over the 
course of transition, albeit to different degrees in different countries. However, a new study 
by one of the authors of this contribution suggests a more nuanced picture. For the case of the 
                                                 
5 With respect to open unemployment, the former Yugoslavia seems to be the only important 
exception. For example, Macedonia suffered from double-digit unemployment rates as early 
as the late 1970s. 
6 The most known indicators of employment protection are the OECD EPL indicator and the 
‘Employing workers’ index from the Doing Business database.  
 7
ex-USSR states, Muravyev (2010) shows that essential rigidities to national labor laws, such 
as restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts and large severance payments, were not 
inherited from the Soviet time, but were rather introduced in the late 1980s-early 1990s, at 
the early stage of transition, when governments attempted to combat looming unemployment. 
The evolution of labor regulations thus followed an inverted U-shaped pattern with the peak 
of rigidity occurring in the 1990s.  
 Most sources nevertheless suggest liberalization of labor laws in TEs in the last 
decade, often quite dramatic as in the case of Georgia and Kazakhstan (Muravyev, 2010). As 
a result, most transition countries are in the middle of the labor market flexibility scale, at 
least as judged by the existing estimates based on the OECD EPL methodology (OECD, 
2009).7 Panel 1 of Figure 4 illustrates these dynamics for the three regions. The data show 
considerable declines in EPL in SEE and especially CIS between 1995 and 2007, although 
not in CEE. Overall, TEs as a group now appear to be quite similar to EU-15. Still, in terms 
of EPL, of all TEs only Georgia is close to the US, which has one of the most liberal sets of 
labor market laws in the world.    
 
3.2. Union density, coverage and bargaining 
Although trade unions (with almost universal membership) existed already at the time of the 
planned economy, in most countries (with the notable exception of Poland) they were de 
facto an integral part of the Communist party and state apparatus, transmitting policy 
directives to the workforce (Borisov and Clarke, 2006). It is fair to say that TEs did not have 
a system of industrial relations typical of mature market economies and such a system was 
only gradually taking shape during the first decade of transition. Perhaps the clearest 
                                                 
7 This is especially true if an assessment of the rigidity of labour laws takes into account the 
issue of law enforcement, which is quite lax in many countries, especially in the former 
USSR (see Gimpelson et al., 2010; Rutkowski and Scarpetta, 2005). 
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manifestation of this development is the decline of unionization rates to the levels observed in 
mature market economies. Panel 2 of Figure 4 illustrates this development. 
Overall, CEE countries have achieved a more visible progress in establishing a system 
of industrial relations typical of Western democracies. For example, the effectiveness of trade 
unions in promoting the economic interests of their members increased already in the 1990s, 
although some scholars argue that even in CEE, industrial relations can be considered still in 
a process of flux.  
The picture emerging in CIS can be illustrated by looking at Russia. According to 
formal criteria, by the mid-1990s the country had an established system of industrial 
relations, characterized by a high unionization rate, multi-level collective bargaining, a high 
coverage rate, and a very high degree of coordination among both employees and employers 
(Cazes, 2002). More recent and more careful examinations of the country’s industrial 
relations system, however, have revealed that many of the institutions created in the 1990s 
remained more like a form without content. In particular, decisions of the tripartite 
commission have no legislative status under Russian law and are therefore not binding; 
general agreements usually contain many purely declarative provisions, and violations of 
these agreements are typically left without sanctions (Borisov and Clarke, 2006). It is nearly 
impossible to define and classify wage coordination mechanisms in the Central Asian 
transition countries. 
 
3.3. The tax wedge on labor 
The early transition period was characterized by relatively high taxation of labor, especially 
in the form of high payroll taxes.  By the early 1990s, TEs had progressive personal income 
taxes, although the highest marginal rates were generally below those in EU-15. A number of 
reforms, aimed at reducing the tax wedge on labor, which can be thought of as the difference 
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between take home pay and the labor cost to the employer, were introduced since then. The 
most notable reform was the introduction of flat personal income taxes in most TEs, 
following the pioneering example of Estonia in 1994. However, the tax burden on labor has 
remained rather high in Central Europe, though not in most of the other transition countries. 
This can be seen in Panel 3 of Figure 4. Indeed, despite some reduction between 1999 and 
2007, the tax wedge on labor in CEE is just a little below that in EU-15. In contrast, SEE and 
in particular the CIS have managed to reduce the tax wedge considerably. It is also 
noteworthy that the tax wedge is far lower in the US than in the other four regions.  
 
3.4. Unemployment benefits 
At the start of transition, even if substantial unemployment rates were foreseen, the 
governments, especially in Central Europe, adopted fairly generous unemployment benefits 
schemes mainly out of political considerations.8 These were subject to cuts, sometimes 
dramatic, in the 1990s as the governments struggled to keep budget discipline in the face of a 
considerable and largely unanticipated decline in output. These cuts concerned both the 
unemployment insurance replacement rates and the maximum potential duration of 
unemployment benefit payments.  
Panels 5 and 6 of Figure 4 show benefit durations and the average replacement rates.  
CEE and SEE have maximum durations of roughly one year, whereas the CIS exhibits the 
shortest durations in the transition region. Compared to the EU-15 and the US, replacement 
rates are not very generous in CEE and the CIS, while SEE has somewhat higher rates. The 
EU-15, in contrast, combines long maximum duration with relatively generous 
                                                 
8 For example, in Poland the strong political position of ‘Solidarity’ allowed the Mazowiecki 
government in December 1989 to introduce layoffs in labour legislation only in tandem with 
the introduction of a very generous unemployment benefit system that in its first, albeit short-
lived, version did grant open-ended benefits to anybody, even if the person had no previous 
work experience.    
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unemployment benefit levels, while the US has the shortest maximum duration of benefits 
combined, however, with a relatively high replacement rate.  
 
3.5. Active labor market policies  
While active labor market programs have been introduced throughout the region, their share 
in GDP has been lower than in the old member states of the EU and substantially lower in 
South-Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The EU-15 on average spends roughly 1 
percent of GDP on ALMP, while all transition regions spend far less (Lehmann and Kluve, 
2010). Especially in the CIS, governments spend very little on such policies.   
 
3.6. Minimum wages 
Non-trivial minimum wages existed in some countries before the start of the transition 
process. For example, in the USSR, the ratio of minimum to average wage (the Kaitz index) 
was about 38% in 1985. In the 1990s, there was a remarkable erosion of minimum wages in 
CIS countries, with the Kaitz index falling below 10% in some countries. In contrast, the 
level of minimum wages in CEE countries has been maintained at a much higher level. In the 
early 2000s, CEE and SEE had minimum wages around 40% of the average wage.   
 
4. Institutions as Determinants of Labor Market Performance  
The evidence on how labor market institutions and policies have affected labor market 
outcomes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is scarce. This is mainly caused by data 
constraints, especially regarding the early stages of the transition process.  For example, it 
was only in the early 2000s when the first cross-country data on the stringency of labor 
regulations in the region appeared. In general, the quality of data is better in the new member 
states of the EU, and declines southwards and especially eastwards. The countries of Central 
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Asia have by far the worst availability of data on labor market performance and labor market 
institutions.   
As a result, most of the existing studies of labor market institutions in transition 
countries are based on data from the new member states and/or adopt a partial approach by 
focusing on particular institutions and policies, often within a particular country. A major 
problem of many studies that focus on specific institutions is thus that they do not allow for 
general equilibrium effects and interactions between institutions, a key issue in the modern 
literature on the institutional determinants of labor market performance. There is only a 
handful of cross-country studies that attempt to analyze the role of labor market institutions, 
including Cazes and Nesporova (2003), Fialova and Schneider (2009), as well as Lehmann 
and Muravyev (2010) which rely on standard linear regression models as in, e.g., Nickell 
(1997). Of these studies, most use data from OECD or EU-15 countries augmented with data 
from a handful of transition countries (typically, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia); to date, Lehmann and Muravyev (2010) remains the only study that provides a 
comprehensive analysis of over 20 TEs, which also looks at interactions between different 
institutions and policies. We, therefore, focus on the results of this work, drawing on other 
evidence when appropriate. 
 
4.1. The impact of institutions on labor market performance in isolation 
We organize our discussion of the impact of labor market institutions on labor market 
outcomes around Table 1, which gives a non-technical summary of the empirical evidence 
presented in the study by Lehmann and Muravyev. Important insights are gained by looking 
at several measures of labor market performance, in this special case, at the employment rate, 
the unemployment, long-term unemployment and youth unemployment rates.  
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 Panel 1 of Table 1 shows which institutions impact on the four measures of labor 
market performance when each institution is looked at individually.  EPL has a very strong 
negative impact on the employment rate and a strong positive effect on the youth 
unemployment rate. So, on average, stricter employment protection legislation seems to 
reduce the employment rate in transition countries and increase youth unemployment. This 
result is in line with theoretical considerations: stricter EPL protects incumbent workers but 
firms are reluctant to hire new labor market entrants, thus possibly depressing overall 
employment and increasing youth unemployment. The empirical evidence on the impact of 
EPL presented before our study was based on more limited data with respect to the set of 
transition countries and to time, and is also rather contradictory and inconclusive and thus not 
very useful in buttressing the validity of the results shown in the first row of panel 1. 
Increasing expenditures on ALMP only seems to lower the youth unemployment rate 
according to the second row of panel 1. This is not that surprising given how little transition 
countries spend on these policies and given that many governments, especially in CEE and 
SEE, have tried to fight the high incidence of youth unemployment by concentrating 
expenditures on this group of the unemployed. Overall unemployment and long-term 
unemployment do not seem affected by ALMP.9 These general equilibrium results that are 
achieved with data covering most TEs and most of the transition period are corroborated, at 
least in part, by the microeconometric and macroeconometric evaluation literature on ALMP 
in transition countries summarized in Lehmann and Kluve (2010). For ALMP measures to 
work at the individual level, careful targeting is required; in addition, there seems to exist a 
hierarchy of measures with respect to their effectiveness: job brokerage and retraining and 
further training seem particularly promising in that they increase the average likelihood of a 
                                                 
9 Lehmann and Muravyev (2010) do find negative effects of ALMP on overall 
unemployment and long-term unemployment. However, given the small number of 
observations used in their macroeconomic regressions these effects are not significant at 
conventional levels.  
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participant to find regular employment. Wage and job subsidies applied in TEs produce 
mixed results, while public works are nearly unanimously considered detrimental to a 
participant’s chances to gain regular employment because of stigmatization or benefit 
churning mechanisms. The general equilibrium effects in individual countries produced by 
earlier macroeconometric work, on the other hand, are rather inconclusive since, e.g., in a low 
unemployment country, like the Czech Republic in the 1990s, researchers have found 
increased outflows from unemployment caused by increased expenditures on ALMP, while 
an insignificant impact was found in Poland where unemployment has been notoriously high 
throughout the transition period.  
The third significant determinant of labor market performance is the tax wedge on 
labor. As we can see in the third row of panel 1, an increase in labor taxation will lower the 
employment rate but will not affect the unemployment measures. This is in line with previous 
empirical evidence insofar as all previous studies that focused on TEs unambiguously hint at 
the detrimental effect of high taxation on labor market performance. However, in some 
studies increasing the tax wedge raises unemployment, in others it lowers employment and 
participation levels. When one looks at the average impact of the tax wedge across most TEs 
as is done in our study, the demand for labor seems to be the most important channel through 
which the tax wedge operates, since the employment rate will be strongly co-determined by 
labor demand while the three types of unemployment should be driven predominantly by 
labor supply decisions.  
The fourth institution that has some impact on labor market performance in TEs is 
union density. Countries where more workers are enrolled as members of a trade union have 
on average a lower employment rate. Some corroborating, albeit relatively weak, evidence 
can be found in Ederveen and Thissen (2007) who show that higher union density increases 
unemployment. Unfortunately it was impossible to find data on collective bargaining for all 
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TEs. Studies that analyze the impact of collective bargaining on labor market performance for 
a subset of transition countries in general find a positive impact.  
The last two institutions shown in panel 1, the duration of unemployment benefits and 
their level, do not have any effect with respect to all four measures of labor market 
performance. This result is very much in line with earlier evidence as Commander and 
Heitmueller (2007) as well as Ederveen and Thissen (2007) find no effect of the duration and 
generosity of unemployment benefits on unemployment. The apparently weaker link between 
unemployment benefit systems and labor market performance if compared to OECD 
countries can be explained, at least in part, by the low job creation capacity of most transition 
countries over most of the transition period. In other words, labor supply mechanisms are 
relatively unimportant when analyzing outflows from unemployment as has been well 
demonstrated for example in the case of Hungary by Micklewright and Nagy (2010).10 
Analyzing the impact of institutions on labor market performance in isolation, three of the six 
institutions and policies, namely EPL, tax wedge and ALMP seem to be of particular policy 
relevance implying, e.g., in the case of the tax wedge and EPL, that the liberalizing agenda 
promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions has some merit.11 
 
4.2. The complementary nature of labor market institutions and policies 
                                                 
10The design of unemployment benefit systems, very different when we compare CEE and 
the CIS, had an important impact on labour market performance at the beginning of the 
transition, though (Boeri and Terrell, 2002).  Relatively generous benefits in CEE created a 
wage floor that made labour costly, leading to large layoffs, which resulted in a rapid rise of 
unemployment. At the same time it caused a high reservation wage implying a ‘stagnant’ 
unemployment pool. In the CIS, having not very generous benefit provisions, no such wage 
floor existed, resulting in wage adjustment rather than employment adjustment. A more 
moderate rise in unemployment and larger outflows from unemployment were the 
consequences according to Boeri and Terrell.     
11 We do not discuss the effect of minimum wages on labour market performance, since there 
are no cross-country studies covering the majority of TEs that allow any generalizing 
inferences. 
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We finish our analysis by looking at what happens when institutions interact with each other. 
Some researchers suggest that institutions and policies interact in a systematic fashion and 
thus act in a complementary way when reforms of several institutions are tackled 
simultaneously. Complementarity can be explained with a classic example shown in Nickell 
(1997), discussing the level of unemployment benefits. Ceteris paribus, a high level of 
unemployment benefits should imply a higher unemployment rate, but when interacted with a 
short duration of these benefits and large expenditures on ALMP, generous unemployment 
benefits might result in better labor market performance. For OECD countries, several studies 
have pointed at this complementary interaction of institutions.12 Lehmann and Murvayev 
(2010) is to date the only study which looks at the issue of reform complementarities in 
transition countries. They augment the baseline regression equation such as in Nickell (1997) 
with pairwise interactions of labor market institutions and policies for the full sample of 
transition countries. Their results are briefly discussed here. 
Raising expenditures on ALMP will have a stronger impact on unemployment and 
long-term unemployment if the labor market is characterized by a relatively low tax wedge 
(row 1 of panel 2). This result is intuitively quite plausible. If, e.g., an ALMP measure 
targeted at the long-term unemployed is meant to rebuild their human capital, such a measure 
will result in larger outflows into employment if labor is taxed less. A similar argument can 
be made with the interaction of ALMP and EPL. ALMP measures are meant to make the 
unemployed fit for unsubsidized regular employment. If EPL is relatively unregulated, firms 
will be more willing to hire from the unemployment pool, a result that is shown in row 5 of 
panel 2. The complementary effect of lowering the tax wedge and shortening benefit duration 
also seems to us rather convincing. According to row 12 of panel 2, this complementarity will 
boost outflows from long-term and youth unemployment. It is these results that are 
                                                 
12 One such study is Bassanini and Duval (2009). 
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particularly interesting from a policy point of view as they imply that broad reform packages 
that tackle more than one institution or policy will result in better labor market performance 
than reforming only one institution at a time.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The above analysis documents considerable heterogeneity in the evolution of labor markets in 
TEs over the last two decades, especially at the level of separate countries. The countries of 
the CIS appear by far the most diverse in terms of economic development and labor market 
dynamics, with increasing divergence in the most recent years.  
The set of labor market institutions that TEs had at the beginning of transition was 
rather atypical of mature market economies, but has changed considerably over the last two 
decades. There has been considerable liberalization of labor regulations in TEs, more 
pronounced than in the old EU member states. By now, most TEs have established sets of 
labor market institutions and policies, which are similar to those existing in mature market 
economies. 
 A growing literature suggests the importance of labor market institutions in the 
determination of labor market outcomes in TEs. This is particularly true of EPL, the tax 
wedge and ALMP. Overall, data from TEs suggest that deregulation of labor markets 
improves their performance. There is also substantial evidence from TEs that reforming two 
institutions jointly or applying broad reform packages will generate larger benefits than a 
partial reform focusing on a single labor market institution.  
 This brief review leaves untouched several important issues that might have strong 
impacts on labor market dynamics in TEs. This is particularly true of inter-country 
(undocumented) migration and informal employment, which have apparently been more 
pronounced in transition than in OECD countries. The evidence on these phenomena in TEs 
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remains scarce; it is still to be seen how they interact with and shape labor markets in 
transition countries.   
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Figure 1. GDP dynamics in transition countries, EU-15, and US  
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Notes: Unweighted averages for TEs and EU-15. The data come from EBRD and OECD 
databases.  
 
Figure 2. Employment-to-population ratios in transition countries, EU-15, and US. 
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Notes: 15-64 for EU-15 and 16-64 for US. Unweighted averages for TEs and EU-15. The 
data are from TRANSMONEE and OECD databases.  
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Figure 3. Unemployment rates in transition countries, EU-15, and US. 
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Notes: Unweighted averages for TEs and EU-15. The data are from TRANSMONEE and 
OECD databases. 
 
Figure 4. Labor market institutions by region (1995 to 2007) 
Employment protection legislation (OECD methodology)
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Source: Lehmann and Muravyev (2010). 
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Table 1. Institutions and labor market outcomes (Lehmann and Muravyev 2010).  
 
Panel 1. Baseline results.  
  
 
Employment 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Long-term unempl. 
rate 
Youth unempl. 
rate 
EPL --- 0 0  ++ 
ALMP 0 0 0 --- 
TAX - 0 0 0 
DENS - 0 0 0 
BEND  0 0 0 0 
BENF 0 0 0 0 
Note: -, -- and ---: negative impact and significant at the 10%, the 5% and the 1% 
significance levels;  ++: positive impact and significant at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
Panel 2. Interactions between institutions and their complementarity   
  Employment 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Long-term 
unempl. rate 
Youth unempl. 
rate 
ALMP_TAX 0 Comp** Comp** 0 
ALMP_DENS 0 Comp** Comp* Comp** 
ALMP_BENF 0 0 0 0 
ALMP_BEND Comp** 0 0 0 
ALMP_EPL 0 Comp* Comp* Comp** 
EPL_TAX 0 0 0 0 
EPL_DENS 0 0 0 0 
EPL_BENF 0 0 0 0 
EPL_BEND 0 0 0 0 
TAX_DENS 0 0 0 0 
TAX_BENF 0 0 0 0 
TAX_BEND 0 0 Comp** Comp*** 
DENS_BENF 0 0 0 0 
DENS_BEND 0 0 0 0 
BENF_BEND 0 0 0 0 
Note: Comp***, Comp**, Comp*: Complementary at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels.  
 
